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We provide a long term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement. In a 
Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives to retire early are embedded, we derive 
a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. While aging has 
opposite economic and political effects on social security contributions, it may lead to postponing retirement -- 
by reducing the generosity of pension benefits -- unless the political effect leads to a large increase in 
contribution and hence higher benefits. Economic slowdowns, captured by a reduction in wage income in youth, 
will also induce workers to postpone retirement and to vote for less social security. 
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   1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Retirement decisions represent one of the hottest issues in the current social
security debate. Several studies (see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, and Gruber
and Wise, 1999 and 2003) suggest that the individual retirement behavior is
strongly aﬀected by the design of the social security system. Retirement is
concentrated at early and normal retirement age, as most individuals tend to
retire as soon as this opportunity is available. Moreover, most social security
systems provide strong incentives, such as large implicit taxes on continuing to
work, to anticipate retirement. However, the individual retirement behavior is
also largely inﬂuenced by wealth or income eﬀects. Several recent studies (see
Costa, 1988, Coronado and Perozek, 2003, Buetler, Huguenin and Teppa, 2005,
and Euwals, Van Vuuren and Wolthoﬀ, 2006) in fact show that both expected
and unexpected increase in workers’ income or wealth induce them to retire
early.
The massive use of early retirement provisions and their generosity have
contributed to the deterioration of the ﬁnancial sustainability of the system,
already under stress because of population aging. In fact, several international
organizations - such as the European Union at the 2001 Lisbon Meetings -
have advocated an increase in the eﬀective retirement age, or - analogously
- the increase in the activity rate among individuals aged above 55 years, as
a key policy measure to control the rise in social security expenditure. In a
nutshell, postponing the retirement age has become a common element to all
social security reform’s proposals. Yet, whether these policy prescriptions will
actually be adopted depends on the politics of early retirement (see Fenge and
Pestieau, 2005, for a detailed discussion of early retirement issues, and Galasso
and Profeta, 2002, for a survey of the political economy of social security).
This paper provides a political economy framework that features a double
1link between the retirement decisions and the political determination of the so-
cial security contribution rates. The design of the social security system — and in
particular the contribution rate and the generosity of the pension beneﬁts — has
the usual eﬀect on the economic individual retirement decisions. In the political
arena, the mass of early retirees helps to determine the evolution of the social
security system as individuals condition their voting decisions on this relevant
information. This Markovian politico economy model that characterizes the po-
litical equilibrium sequences of social security tax rates and the corresponding
use of early retirement provisions suggests a positive link between social security
contributions and mass of early retirees.
This paper’s main contribution is to analyze the political role of (negative)
income eﬀects, for instance driven by aging or economic slowdowns, on the
social security contribution rates and retirement age. In line with the existing
literature (see Galasso and Profeta, 2002), our theoretical framework suggests
that aging has two opposite eﬀects on the contribution rates: it tends to decrease
them, since it makes the public pension system less proﬁtable, but it makes
the median voter poorer, and thus induces higher social security. Despite this
ambiguous result, however, aging may lead to less early retirement by reducing
the generosity of the pension beneﬁts, unless the social security contribution rate
increases dramatically due to the political eﬀect of aging. persistant economic
slowdowns, as captured by a decrease of the income of young people, will induce
all young agents to postpone retirement and to prefer less social security.
There exists a vast literature on retirement decisions. Already two decades
ago, Feldstein (1974) and Boskin and Hurd (1978) analyzing the determinants of
the decline in the labor force participation of elderly workers pointed at two key
parameters of social security systems: the income guarantee and the implicit tax
on earnings. Endogenous retirement decisions have been analyzed by showing
how pension systems introduce distortions in the labor supply choice (see among
2others Diamond and Mirrless, 1978, Hu, 1979, Crawford and Lilien, 1981, and
Michel and Pestieau, 1999). A new literature has lately emerged on the political
economy of early retirement (see Fenge and Pestieau, 2005, Lacomba and Lagos,
2000, Casamatta et al., 2002, Cremer and Pestieau 2000, Cremer et al. 2002,
Conde Ruiz and Galasso, 2003 and 2004), but has generally neglected the role
of income eﬀects. Markovian politico-economic models of social security have
been recently studied by Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al (2003),
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2004), Forni (2005). These models however focus
on social security and abstract from the role of retirement. They also neglect
the political impact of income eﬀects, which are instead empirically signiﬁcant.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a Markov-
ian politico economic model. Section 3 analyzes the impact of aging and of a
negative income eﬀect on the steady state level of early retirement and social
security. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Politico-Economic Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
We introduce a simple two -period overlapping generations model. Every period,
two generations are alive, we call them young and old. We consider a continuum
of individuals heterogeneous in young and old wage income. The wage income
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with an average equal to 1 and cumulative density function F(δ).
Young individuals work: they receive a wage, wy,p a yap a y r o l lt a x ,τ,
on labour income and save all their disposable income for old age consumption.
There exists a storage technology that transforms a unit of today’s consumption
3into 1+r units of tomorrow’s consumption. All private intertemporal transfers
of resources into the future are assumed to take place through this technology.
Old individuals decide what fraction, z, of the second period to spend working;
in other words, they decide when to retire. An old individual who works a
proportion z of the second period receives a net labor income equal to wo(1−τ),
for the fraction z of the period, while he receives a pension p for the remaining
fraction (1 − z). Population grows at a non-negative rate, n;a n dw ea b s t r a c t




t j = y,o. Moreover, we assume that the
economy is dynamically eﬃcient, r>n .
The life time budget constraint for an agent born at time t is equal to:
co
t+1 =( 1− τt)w
y
t (1 + r)+( 1− τt+1)zt+1wo
t+1 + pt+1(1 − zt+1) (1)
where co
t+1 is old age consumption at time t +1 , τt and τt+1 are the payroll
taxes respectively at periods t and t +1 , r is the exogenous interest rate, and
subscripts indicate the calendar time.
Every individual’s pension beneﬁt depends on her contribution in youth and
in old age. In particular, we assume the individual pension to be earning-
related for the contributions paid in old age, but ﬂat for the contributions paid
in youth. This combination induces an element of within-cohort redistribution,
from high to low income individuals. As in Tabellini (2000) and in Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso (2005), this feature is crucial to ensure the political sustainability
of social security system, through the support of the low ability young1.T h e
use of an old age earning related component allows also to model the incentive
eﬀect created by current contributions and pension beneﬁts in the retirement
decision. The total pension beneﬁts obtained by an individual in her old age at
time t +1is thus:
1Alternatively, a 3-period OLG could be introduced in which social security is supported
by a voting coalition of old and middle aged individuals. See Galasso and Profeta (2002) for
a discussion of diﬀerent elements leading to the political sustainability of social security.
4pt+1(1 − zt+1)=τt+1wo
t+1zt+1 + pt+1 (2)
Since we concentrate on budget balanced PAYG social security systems, the
ﬁxed component is
pt+1 = τt+1(1 + nt+1)w
y
t+1 (3)
In the aggregate, a balanced budget pay as you go (PAYG) social security












Agents maximize a logarithmic utility function, which depends on old age
consumption and leisure:
U(ct+1,zt+1)=l nco
t+1 + φln(1 − zt+1) (5)
where φ<1 measures the relative importance of leisure to the individuals.
An old agent at time t+1hence maximizes eq.5 with respect to zt+1 subject
to the budget constraints at eq.1 and 3, since agents internalize the eﬀect of their
retirement behavior on the pension beneﬁts via the earning related component.
The solution of the maximization problems yields the following optimal in-


































This individual retirement decision displays standard properties. A positive in-
come eﬀect, such as an increase in the net labor income in youth, induces all
agents to retire early; while an increase in the net labor income in old age, or
a decrease in the pension beneﬁts, would lead them to postpone retirement —
5due mainly to a positive substitution eﬀect. A generalized increase in wages —
both in youth and in old age — would combine income and substitutions eﬀects.
If individuals appreciate the impact that an increase in wages has on their pen-
sion beneﬁts (see eq.7), in this simple formulation, the income and substitution
eﬀects perfectly compensate one another, thus leaving the retirement decision
unaﬀected. In the remaining of the paper, we will hence concentrate on changes
in the wages in youth to analyze income eﬀects and in the wages in old age to
study incentive eﬀects.
To ensure that no type-δ agent will end up either working the entire old age or
retiring at the end of youth — that is, to avoid corner solutions in the individual
labor supply decision — some conditions need to be imposed. In particular,
with no social security system in place, i.e., for τt =0∀t, no agent will ever




t (1 + r). We shall hence assume that this condition holds. For
positive contribution rates, the condition that individual labor supply decisions
lead to interior solutions, i.e., b zt ∈ (0,1) ∀t, amounts to impose some restrictions










The mass of employed elderly in the economy2 at time t +1can easily be


































Since individuals with diﬀerent income display diﬀerent retirement behav-
iors, the mass of retirees will depend on the distribution of income in the econ-
omy. In particular, due to the incentive eﬀect embedded in the model, high
income elderly workers will be induced to retire later than low income workers.
Yet, this eﬀect is not linear, but tends to magnify the importance of the agents
who enjoy very low income in old age and hence have an incentive to retire very
early. The parameter b δ captures this aspect by weighting the mass of these
low-income elderly with their retirement behavior. The larger — for instance —
the share of low-income elderly, the larger b δ will be; and hence the larger the
mass of (early) retirees (1 − Z).
Finally, by substituting the individual decision at eq.6 and the social security
budget constraint, we can easily derive the indirect utility respectively of a type-





2.2 The Political Equilibrium
The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework in which to
analyze the link between early retirement provision and the size of the social
security system. As already showed at eq.6, early retirement behavior may be
induced by speciﬁc features of the social security system, such as the size of
contribution rates and pension beneﬁts. Here, we study the political determi-
nation of this social security contribution rate. Every year, elections take place
in which the current social security contribution rate is determined. All young
and old agents participate at the elections. Their preferences over the contri-
bution rate may diﬀer — typically according to their income (δ type) and age.
We follow a well established tradition in political economics by concentrating on
7the median voter decision. Moreover, due to the intergenerational nature of the
system, we allow for some interdependence between current and future political
decisions. In particular, we analyze Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes3 of a
repeated voting game over the social security contribution rate. Since we want
to examine the possible link between the use of early retirement provisions and
the size of the social security system, we base our notion of Markov equilibrium
on the idea that current voters — in taking their policy decisions — expect future
policy-makers to base their political decisions on social security on the mass of
early retirees — or employed elderly — in the economy. These expectations will
be validated in equilibrium.
More speciﬁcally, at every period t, the median voter in each generation of
voters — typically a young individual4 — decides her most favorite social security
system (i.e., the tax rate τt). In taking her decision, she expects her current
decision to have an impact of future policies. In particular, her expectations
about the future social security tax rate — and hence about her pension beneﬁts
— depend on the current level of employed elderly, according to a function τt+1 =
qe(Zt). Hence, future contribution rates depend on the current level of labor
force participation by the elderly, which is in turn aﬀected by the current voter’s
decision over the social security contribution rate. The median voter’s optimal
decision can thus be obtained by maximizing her lifecycle utility with respect










t (τt,Q(Zt (τt,τt−1)),δ) (12)
We can now deﬁne the Markov political equilibrium as follows
3For examples of Markov equilibria, see Krusell et al.(1996), Grossman and Helpman
(1998), Bassetto (1999), Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al. (2003), Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2004), Forni (2005).
4It is easy to show that, in this setting, an elderly voter will support a 100% contribution
rate. For a positive population growth rate, n>0,t h em e d i a nv o t e rw i l lh e n c eb ey o u n g .
8Deﬁnition 1 A Markov political equilibrium is a pair of functions (Q,Z),w h e r e
Q :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a policy rule, τt = Q(Zt−1),a n dZ :[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1]
is an aggregation of private decision rules, Zt (τt,τ−1)=
R δ
δ ˆ ztf(δ)dδ,s u c ht h a t
the following functional equations hold:























m identiﬁes the median voter’s type among the young.
The ﬁrst and last equilibrium conditions require that τt maximizes the ob-
jective function of the median voter — a type-δ
m young individual — taking into
account that the future social security system tax rate, τt+1, depends on the
current social security tax rate, τt, via the mass of elderly employed and thus the
private labor supply decision of the elderly. Furthermore, it requires Q(Zt−1) to
be a ﬁx e dp o i n ti nt h ef u n c t i o n a le q u a t i o ni np a r ti )o ft h ed e ﬁnition. In other
words, if agents believe future beneﬁts at any time t + j to be set according to
τt+j = Q(Zt+j−1), then the same function Q(Zt−1) has to deﬁne the optimal
voting decision today. The second equilibrium condition requires that all old
individuals choose their labor supply optimally.
In order to compute the Markov political equilibrium, we have to consider
the optimal social security tax rate chosen by the median voter at time t who
maximizes the indirect utility function with respect to τt and subject to τt+1 =
Q(Zt(τt,τt−1)).
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is:
−w
y






where the ﬁrst element represents the current cost to the median voter in terms
of higher contributions, while the second term represents the future beneﬁts
corresponding to a higher pension, if a higher current contribution leads to
9a higher contribution rate also tomorrow: ∂τt+1/∂τt > 0. The redistributive
design of the social security system yields the usual result that — with perfect
ﬁnancial markets — the most preferred contribution rate of a young individual
is decreasing in her income, since the contribution cost depends on the wage
income while (part of) the beneﬁts do not. The elderly most preferred social
security contribution rate does not depend on their type and is always larger
than any young’s. These features command the usual distribution of social
security preferences among the voters, which is displayed in the next proposition.
The solution of the maximization problem of the median voter yields the
equilibrium ﬁscal policies, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The set of feasible ﬁscal policies {τ∗
t}
∞
t=s ∈ [0,1] which can be
supported by a Markovian politico-economic equilibrium satisﬁes:
τt+1 = Q(Zt)=A −
(1 + φ)δ
m
t (1 + r)wo
t










and A, the free parameter pinned down by the ﬁrst median voter’s expecta-
























The result in the above proposition points to the existence of a positive
political link between the current use of the early retirement provisions — that is,
the mass of (early) retirees (1−Z) — and the future social security contribution
rate. This link complements the economic channel running from the social
security contribution rate to the current labor supply decision of the elderly,
as described at eq.6. In particular, a current increase in the social security
10contribution rate — by reducing the opportunity cost of retirement — leads to
more current retirees, which in turn creates expectations of higher future social
security contributions — and hence more early retirees in the future.
By exploiting this double link between contribution rate and mass of retirees,




t (1 + r)




t (1 + r)2






t (1 + r)




Interestingly, the dynamics of the contribution rate involves more than just
one period, as the contribution rate at time t +1depends — positively — on the
tax rate at time t; but negatively on the tax rate at time t − 1. This is due to
the impact that the contribution rates at time t and t−1 have on the retirement
decision at time t.
It is now convenient to consider a constant demographic process, with nt =
nt+i = n ∀i, and to deﬁne α =( 1 + r)/(1 + n) as the performance of the
saving (storage) technology relatively to the PAYG social security system; since
we assumed the economy to be dynamically eﬃcient, then α>1.
The next proposition examines the dynamic properties of the sequence of
contribution rates.
Proposition 3 If αδ
m < 1 and α<b δ, the Markovian politico-economic equi-
librium path converges to a stable steady state corresponding to
τ =
wyφ(1 + n)b δA− woδ
mα + α2δ
mφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)b δ
³
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
´ .


















11The above proposition suggests that — even in this dynamically eﬃcient
economy — a stable steady state with a positive level of the social security con-
tribution rate may emerge as an equilibrium of the Markovian political game, if
two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst condition, αδ
m < 1, is relatively standard
in the social security literature and requires the young type-δ
m median voter
to obtain a better deal from social security than from alternative assets, due to
the redistributive nature of the social security system. In order for this condi-
tion to be satisﬁed, together with a highly redistributive social security system,
the economy has to feature a high level of income inequality5,a sm e a s u r e db y
the density function f(δ). Yet, unlike most systems analyzed in this literature
(see Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003), we here allow the agents to choose their
retirement age. The second condition, α<b δ, amounts to assume that a large
number of individuals retire early. In particular, as shown by the equation in
the proposition above, if this condition is satisﬁed, the impact of the (steady
state) contribution rate on the (steady state) mass of employed elderly is neg-
ative, since higher taxes lead to more early retirees; thereby validating — also
at steady state — the negative impact of the current contribution rate (see eq.
10). In the remaining sections, we will assume these two conditions to be always
satisﬁed.
3 The future of Social Security and Early Re-
tirement
3.1 The role of Aging
The equilibrium policy function obtained in the previous section allows us to
analyze the eﬀects of aging on the social security tax rate and on the use of early
retirement. In line with standard political economy models of social security
5A necessary but not suﬃcient condition is that the income distribution is skewed in the
standard direction, and thus δm <E(δ)=1 .
12(for a survey, see Galasso and Profeta, 2002), in our model, aging has opposite
economic and political eﬀects on the steady state social security tax rate. Among
the former, aging reduces the proﬁtability of the PAYG pension system with
respect to alternative savings; and may convince the median voter to downsize
the system — in order to increase her private provision of retirement income
through alternative private assets. Moreover, for a given contribution rate, an
increase in the share of elderly in the population reduces the pension beneﬁts,
thereby inducing the elderly to postpone retirement. This reduction in the mass
of (early) retirees will then lead to a decrease in the contribution rate. Among
the latter, aging tends to change the identity of the median voter, who becomes
poorer, and hence keener on increasing the contribution rate.
The next proposition summarizes the impact of the former, economic eﬀects,
by addressing the eﬀect of aging on the steady state social security contribution
rate, for a given median voter type.
Proposition 4 For a given median voter type, δ
m,i fb δ ∈ (0,wo/(wyφ(1 + n))),
aging (corresponding to a reduction in the population growth rate) decreases the
steady state social security contribution rate, ∂τ/∂n>0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, aging has the expected economic impact on the social security con-
tribution rate at steady state, provided that the mass of (early) retirees is not
too large, i.e., b δ is below a threshold. As the population growth rate drops, the
implicit return from a PAYG social security system decreases. Median voters
will modify the policy function by making it more responsive — in absolute terms
— to the mass of employed elderly.
The political eﬀect of aging is captured by the change in the identify of
the median voter, who becomes poorer6. The next proposition shows that — in
6From the expression for the median voter at proposition 2, it is easy to see that ∂δm
∂n =
13line with the existing literature — a poorer median voter will prefer more social
security provided that the mass of (early) retirees is not too large, i.e., b δ is small
— i.e., below the same threshold as in the previous proposition.
Proposition 5 If b δ ∈ (0,wo/(wyφ(1 + n))), the equilibrium steady state social




These two propositions suggest that the economic and political eﬀects of
aging push in opposite directions. Which eﬀect will dominate represents an
empirical question that remains to be settled7.
How does aging aﬀect the individual retirement decisions and hence the mass
of elderly workers? Our political economy model indentiﬁes two channels for the
aging process to inﬂuence the retirement decisions. Aging — as characterized by
a reduction in the population growth rate, n — reduces the proﬁtability of the
social security system. For a given level of the contribution rate, τ,p e n s i o n
beneﬁts will decrease (see eq.3). This negative substitution (and income) eﬀect
hence leads to postponing retirement. Yet, aging also modiﬁes the political de-
termination of the social security contribution rate, as discussed in the previous
two propositions. If contributions increase, individuals will retire early — and
viceversa. If is useful at this point to deﬁne ετn = ∂τ
∂n
1+n
τ as the elasticity of
the social security contribution rate to the population growth. Clearly, ετn < 0




7For instance, Galasso and Profeta (2004) simulate the political eﬀect to prevail, whereas
Razin’s et al (2002) empirical analysis leads the opposite results. See also Disney (2007),
Simonovits (2007) and Galasso and Profeta (2007) for empirical and theoretical contributions
on this debate.
14Proposition 6 Aging increases the mass of employed elderly at steady state,
∂Z/∂n < 0,i fετn > −1 .
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition hence suggests that aging will indead help to reduce the
widespread early retirement phenomenon, by forcing less generous pension ben-
eﬁts; unless the political eﬀect — characterized by the median voter becoming
p o o r e r—i ss os t r o n ga st ol e a dt oal a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt h es o c i a ls e c u r i t yc o n t r i -
bution, and hence to an increase also in the pension generosity.
3.2 The Role of the Income eﬀects
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw eh i g h l i g h tt h er o l eo fi n c o m ee ﬀects on retirement decisions and
thus on the social security equilibrium tax rate. While most studies concentrate
on the role of the incentives (substitution eﬀect) in the retirement behavior,
available empirical evidence (see for instance Costa, 1998, and Coronado and
Perozek, 2003) suggest that income eﬀects do play a crucial role in the labor
supply decisions of elderly workers.
The political economy model presented in section 2 may help to understand
how changes in the individual retirement decisions induced by income eﬀects
modify the political determination of social security and hence the equilibrium
mass of early retirees. To focus on the role of the income eﬀect, we consider a
permanent variation in the wage income at youth only. A reduction in the wage
income at youth decreases the agents’ lifetime income both directly and through
a reduction in the pension beneﬁts8,w h i c ha r eﬁnanced by a contribution on
the wage income at youth (see eq. 3). If, however, we were to consider a
generalized permanent change in the wage income both in youth and in old age,
an additional (strong) substitution eﬀect would arise. As discussed in section
8Clearly, this reduction in pension beneﬁts creates also a substitution eﬀect, since agents
have an incentive to postpone retirement.
152.1, in this case income and substitution eﬀects would perfectly compensate
each other.
Proposition 7 A decrease of the average wage income in youth, wy,l e a d st o
a reduction of the steady state social security contribution rate ∂τ/∂wy > 0 and
to an increase in the steady state mass of employed elderly ∂Z/∂wy < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
A reduction in the wage income at youth induces individuals to postpone
retirement, due to a negative income eﬀect — since their lifetime income de-
creases — but also to a substitution eﬀect — since the pension beneﬁts, which
are ﬁnanced by the workers’ wage, decrease. Although at steady state neither
the overall proﬁtability of the social security system nor the identity of the me-
dian voter is aﬀected by a permanent drop in the wage income in youth, the
steady state social security contribution rate decreases, since most individuals
tend to postpone retirement, thereby reducing the share of (early) retirees. In-
terestingly, the magnitude of the adjustment in the retirement age driven by
a change of the young income is decreasing in income, thus implying that low
income workers will react more actively to a negative income eﬀect. In our po-
litical equilibrium, this increase in the overall fraction of employed elderly will
command a lower contribution rate. The reduction of early retirees at steady
state depends instead both on the direct negative income and substitution ef-
fects caused by the reduction of w
y
t and on an indirect substitution eﬀect due to
the decrease of the social security tax rate, which leads to fewer (early) retirees.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper concentrates on the long term determinants of the retirement deci-
sions and on the future evolution of social security system and early retirement
provisions. In our politico-economic Markovian environment, every period a
16young low-income median voter determines the social security contribution by
considering the evolution of the early retirement behavior. We emphasize the
role of substitution and income eﬀects in these retirement decisions. The incen-
tive eﬀects have been analyzed by a large empirical literature, which shows how
(at the margin) non-actuarially fair pension systems may induce rational agents
to retire early, by reducing the opportunity cost of leisure. Income eﬀects have
instead generally been neglected in models of retirement and social security,
despite the empirical evidence suggesting that variation in income and wealth
may modify individual retirement decisions.
In line with the existing political economy literature (see Galasso and Pro-
feta, 2002), in our model, aging has opposite economic and political eﬀects on
social security; and the overall impact depends on which eﬀect dominates.
Yet, aging may lead to a reduction in the widespread use of early retirement
provisions. By commanding less generous pension beneﬁts (for a given level
of contribution rates), aging induces workers to postpone retirement. If the
political eﬀect is not so overwelming as to determine a sizable increase in social
security contributions, and thus also in pension beneﬁts, at steady state aging
societies will be associated with less early retirement.
Morevoer, our model also suggests that a decrease in the wage income in
youth leads to lower social security tax rate and fewer early retirees. To the
extent that this change in young wage income may proxy for a drop in the
life-time labor income, this may prove a crucial result to understand the future
evolution of the early retirement provision. Societies characterized by economic
stagnation or raise in lifetime inequality that increase the share of low-income
individuals may thus be associated with a less pervasive use of these early re-
tirement provisions.
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5.1 Proof of proposition 2
The ﬁrst order condition of the median voter is:
−w
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Substituting eq. 19 and eq. 18 into eq. 17 and using it into the ﬁrst order




t (1 + r)wo
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Integrating the above equation with respect to Zt we obtain
τt+1 = Q(Zt)=A −
(1 + φ)δ
m
t (1 + r)wo
t




where A is a constant of integration.
Since τt+1 = Q(Zt) represents a tax rate, we impose that Q ∈ [0,1].U s i n g
eq. 10 for Zt, it is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for τt+1 to be positive










22Moreover, it is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for τt+1 < 1 is to have
























t ,i ti se a s yt os h o wt h a tA < A if
1+r
1+nt+1δ
m < 1, which is a condition required by the next proposition 3 for
the stability of the system.
Finally, to determine the identity of the median voter, notice that — by
equation 16 — the most preferred social security contribution rate among the
young is weakly decreasing in their income; and that the old always command a
higher tax rate than the any young. For non-negative population growth rates,
the median voter is among the young and has a type δ
m
t , which divides the
distribution of preference in halves: 1+( 1+nt)F(δ
m
t )=1+nt/2.
5.2 Proof of proposition 3
Eq. 14 can be rewritten as
τt+1 − αδ
m

















It is easy to see that three cases arise in the solution of this second order dif-
ferential equation, depending on the sign of the determinant of the associated
characteristic equation
b2 + a1b + a2 =0 (25)
with
a1 = −αδ














































, there are 3 possible cases: (i) real
and distinct roots b1 and b2; (ii) real and equal roots b1 = b2; and (iii) complex
roots b1 and b2.I fαδ
m < 1 and α<b δ, the conditions for a stable convergence
towards the steady state are always satisﬁed.











2 − 4α2 δm
e δ < 2.I f
αδ





2 < 1 because 0 <b 1 <b 2 < 1.
Case ii) The stability property depends on −a1
2 = αδm
2 .F o r αδ
m < 2 the
system converges to the steady state.












e δ .I f
R<1, the system converges to the steady state, although through ﬂuctuations.
Clearly, this is satisﬁed for αδ
m < 1 and α<b δ.
The steady state value of the tax rate corresponds to the particular solution





τ = A −
woδ
m






φ(1+n)e δwyα + α2 δm
e δ
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
(29)
recalling that α =
(1+r)
(1+n),w eh a v e
τ =





wyφ(1 + n)b δ
³
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
´ (30)
Notice that the denominator of τ is always positive since 1 >α δ
m(1− α
e δ ), while
the numerator is positive because A>A ,a sd e ﬁned at Eq.22.
Finally, by imposing τt+1 = τt = τt−1 = τ, after some simple manipulation,














b δ − α
i
τ (31)
24Simple algebra yields that Z ∈ [0,1].
5.3 Proof of proposition 4
In order to prove propositions 4 and 5, it is convenient to introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 If b δ ∈ (0, wo
wyφ(1+n)), K =
wo−αφ(1+n)wy
wyφ(1+n)(e δ−α) > A.
Proof of the lemma: Substituting nt = nt+1 = n and the deﬁnition of α into
the expression for A at eq.23, we need to show that
K =
wo − αφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)
³
b δ − α


























b δ − α
´
⎞
⎠ > 0 (32)
S i n c ew ea s s u m e dt h a t wo
wyφ(1+n) − α>0 and b δ − α>0 ,as u ﬃcient condition
to guarantee the above inequality is that b δ< wo
wyφ(1+n).Q.e.d.
We can not turn to the sign of ∂τ/∂n.
Deﬁne β = α(1 + n), the steady state level of the tax rate becomes
τ =
A(1 + n)2 −
woδmβ
wyφe δ + β
2 δm
e δ


























25which can be written as
A(1 + n)2
b δ




where B1 =2 α − b δ, B2 = wo − α(1 + n)wyφ,a n dB3 =2− αδ
m. Notice that





t φ. T h e r e f o r ew eh a v et w o
possible cases:
• If B1 ≥ 0,f o rα ≥ b δ/2 , ∂τ
∂n > 0 if A ≥− B2B3
B1(1+n)wyφ (< 0),w h i c hi sa l w a y s
true since A>A> 0.
• If B1 < 0,f o rα<b δ/2 , ∂τ
∂n > 0 if A<− B2B3








t φ(1+n)(e δ−α),a n dK>A,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed
—a c c o r d i n gt ot h el e m m aa b o v e—i fb δ ∈ (0,wo
t/(w
y
tφ(1 + n))).A f t e r
simple algebra we have that M>Kif
(2 − αδ
m)








m +b δ (1 − αδ
m) > 0 (36)
which is always satisﬁed, since we assumed 1 >α δ
m.T h u s∂τ/∂n>0.
5.4 Proof of proposition 5
Using the deﬁnition at Proposition 3, we can deﬁne the steady state social
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wy < 0 (39)
with the above inequality being satisﬁed for
A<K=
wo − αφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)
³
b δ − α
´. (40)
Using the lemma above, we know that K>A,a n dt h u sA<Kalways, if




5.5 Proof of proposition 6
The impact of aging on the steady state level of early retirement depends on









































∂n < 0 if ∂τ
∂n
1+n
τ = ετ,n > −1.
5.6 Proof of proposition 7
From the equation for τ at proposition 3, it is immediate to see that ∂τ/∂wy > 0.
























since all terms are negative, because b δ−α>0 by assumption and ∂τ/∂wy > 0.
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